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Abstract
This paper provides new estimates of the impact of the French tax credit on
the employment outcomes of women. We model simultaneously the employment
probability and the determinants of programme eligibility. We improve on earlier
studies in this field that, using a single evaluation equation framework, predicted
ex-ante programme eligibility. Within this framework, we also allow for hours
responses. The data for the analysis are drawn from the French labour force
surveys of years 1999 to 2002. We find no significant impact of the tax credit on
either employment or hours of French women.
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1 Introduction
The French tax credit programme, “la Prime Pour l’Emploi”, was launched by the
Jospin government in 2001. Like other “in-work beneﬁts” measures, the French one
aims at increasing income from work for the low-paid, with the objective of redistrib-
uting income to the less-skilled as well as increasing the incentives to work for those
with low potential earnings. Since the introduction of the measure a number of ex-ante
policy evaluation studies were carried out, all based on microsimulations or on struc-
tural labour supply models (see Stancanelli and Sterdyniak, 2004, for a review of the
earlier literature). The main conclusions from the earlier literature were that the tax
credit had little redistributive impact and very small employment eﬀects, if any at all.
Stancanelli (2004) was the ﬁrst to estimate a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences evaluation model
of the employment eﬀects of the policy. Distinguishing women by their marital status
to allow for the diﬀerential impact of the policy for married and unmarried respondents,
she ﬁnds some evidence of negative employment eﬀects of the policy for married women.
The overall employment impact is found to be insigniﬁcant. Signiﬁcant work partici-
pation disincentives for married women were also found in the American literature by
Eissa and Hoynes (2004a), who concluded that the American Earned Income Tax Credit
reduces work incentives for secondary earners. Both studies do, however, rely on a single
evaluation equation model, and predict ex-ante programme eligibility for non-employed
people. Heim (2005) found a negative eﬀect of the EITC on married women’s hours of
work, using a structural model of labour supply behaviour of married couples. Eissa and
Hoynes (2004b) ﬁnd modest hours reductions for married women, using reduced form
equations for married couples.
We provide new estimates of the employment eﬀects of the tax credit by endogeniz-
ing programme participation. Eligibility to the tax credit depends on earnings. The
employment decision depends in theory on potential earnings as well. As the tax credit
measure is targeted at low-wage workers, a bias in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates
of employment eﬀects of the tax credit will be introduced if unobserved heterogeneity
in earnings aﬀects the employment decision. We tackle this problem by jointly mod-
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elling the employment decision and programme eligibility. Our method of estimation
also provides a solution for the fact that programme eligibility is not observed for the
unemployed. We show that methods based on predicted wages introduce an errors-in-
variables bias. This potential bias is not irrelevant since the unexplained part in wage
regressions usually is sizeable, reﬂected by a low R-squared value. We also expand on
Stancanelli (2004) by modelling hours responses to programme eligibility. To this end,
we use a “naive” linear speciﬁcation of working hours, which does, however, allow for
endogenous programme participation.
We estimate the model for diﬀerent groups of women, distinguishing between single,
married, and cohabiting women. We do not allow the impact of the policy to vary
(directly) with the presence of children given that entitlement to the French tax credit
is not (directly) conditional on this variable. Moreover, children additions to the tax
credit are not very tangible. Besides, Stancanelli (2004) ﬁnds that almost all of French
lone mothers would be entitled to the tax credit if they took up work, so that there is
no straightforward counterfactual for this group of programme participants. The Anglo-
saxon literature ﬁnds positive work participation outcomes for lone mothers (see, for
example, Blundell and Hoynes, 2003, for a review).
We use data from four consecutive years of the French labour force surveys, years
1999 to 2002, to estimate the model. Year 2002 is our policy year.1 Given the 2003
break in the French LFS series of later years and the non-comparability of the labour
market states across the two series, we cannot extend the analysis to later years.
The structure of the paper is the following. The next section describes the tax credit
programme. The evaluation model for, respectively, employment outcomes and hours,
is presented in Section 3, together with the construction of the treatment and control
groups. The data used for the analysis are described in Section 4. The results of the
estimation of the two models are discussed in Section 5. The last section concludes the
1 In practise, this is actually the second year the policy was implemented. The tax credit was
created in February-March 2001 and made payable as from 2001, on basis of tax declarations of year
2001, which related to income and earnings in year 2000. However, given the timing of the labour force
surveys which were carried out in March of each year and collected earnings and income in the current
year, 2001 cannot be possibly considered as a policy year. Therefore, for the purpose of our evaluation
model, years 1999 to 2001 are defined as ”control” years and 2002 is the treatment year.
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paper.
2 The French tax credit measure
The French tax credit was designed to compensate the low-end of the distribution of
tax payers for tax reductions granted to the wealthier households. Tax credit measures
exist in many other OECD countries, such as in the United States, where the Earned
Income Tax Credit is targeted at low income families with children or in the United King-
dom, where the Working Family Tax Credit has similar objectives. Within the “family”
of OECD in-work beneﬁts, the French programme stands out as a “hybrid” measure as
it attempts to achieve a number of diﬀerent objectives, such as discouraging small-hours
part-time jobs and rewarding full-time “minimum wage” workers. Individuals with very
little earnings over the year or working few hours in low-paid jobs are not eligible to the
tax credit. The tapering oﬀ of beneﬁts is such that beneﬁts are the largest at about the
minimum wage level and decrease thereafter.
Alike other in-work beneﬁts schemes in OECD countries, the beneﬁts paid increase
with the number of dependent children for eligible workers and more so for lone parents
in-work, but “children additions” are extremely small. An eligible lone parent is entitled
to a 60 euros yearly addition for the ﬁrst child and to 30 euros extra for each other child.
The children addition for married parents is equal to 30 euros per dependent child, while
the addition for a dependent spouse is 78 euros per year. Childless workers are also
entitled to the tax-credit.
The credit is means-tested on total household income but payable to the individual,
so that within each household both husband and wife may in principle get it.
Eligibility conditions to the French tax credit can be summarized as follows2 (see
2 The earnings and total income bounds have been slightly increased every tax year. For the purposes
of our analysis, the bounds announced in year 2001 are relevant, and were, therefore given above. The
policy year we consider is 2002. The relevant LFS survey was carried out in March 2002. At that time,
individuals knew the eligibility bounds announced in 2001, but they did not yet know the bounds for
2002. In practice, given the time disconnection between the decision to work and the payment of the
tax credit, the actual rules determining the payment of tax credits for the individuals in our sample,
will be those fixed in 2003, as individuals file their tax declarations in March of each year. However, the
relevant tax parameters for the purposes of our analysis are clearly those announced in 2001, as these
were the only one known to individuals at the time of carrying out the 2002 LFS survey.
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Table 1):
- Having worked at least part of the (ﬁscal) year and having earned more than roughly 0.3
of the full-time year-round minimum wage (about 3200 euros) and less than about
1.4 of the full-time year-round minimum wage (almost 15000 euro) on a yearly
base. This upper earnings bound is larger and equal to almost twice the full-time
year-round minimum wage (almost 23000 euros) for those with a dependent spouse
or with a spouse earning less than 0.3 of the full-time year-round minimum wage
(the lower earning bound).
- Reporting total taxable household income below roughly 12000 euros, for single people,
and approximately 24000 euros, for married couples. These total income bounds
are increased by over 3000 euros for each dependent child.
The reason for setting the lower earnings bound was to discourage small hours part-
time jobs. However, few French workers fall below the lower earnings bound for eligibility,
roughly less than 3 per cent of female workers, according to the LFS. But almost 60% of
working women have earnings below the upper earnings bound, which is not surprising
given the compressed shape of the earnings distribution at around the minimum wage
in France and the fact that French women’s earnings are still well below those of men.
Roughly half of French households ﬁling a tax declaration fall below the income bound.
One is then not surprised to ﬁnd out from oﬃcial tax statistics that over eight million
French households were paid a tax credit in 2001, that is to say one out of every three
workers.
The large coverage of the credit contrasts with its small importance. The amounts
paid (see Table 2 and Figure 1) were equal in 2001 to 4.4% of reported (taxable) earnings
for salaries between 0.3 times the full-time year-round minimum wage and the full-time
year-round minimum wage3 and decreased for earnings between the full-time year-round
minimum wage and approximately 1.4 times the full-time year-round minimum wage
(the phase out). Payments are, therefore, the largest for workers earning the minimum
wage.
3 These amounts were increased by later reforms, but remain small by international comparisons.
4
In 2001, the total public expenditure on tax credit payments amounted to over thou-
sand millions of euros, corresponding to an average payment of 150 euros per year per
eligible household. This proﬁle contrasts with records of over one million recipients of
the Working Family Tax Credit in the UK, for an average yearly expenditure of over
2500 euros per household, and nearly 20 millions recipients of the EITC in the USA,
with an average expenditure of almost 700 euros per household.
However, the employment eﬀects of tax credit programmes are not only a function of
the amounts paid. For example, the UK measure has been found to be less eﬀective than
the USA one, in spite of the larger amounts paid by the British tax credit. In particular,
the American Earned Income Tax Credit has been found to increase signiﬁcantly work
incentives of lone parents, while the overall employment eﬀects are quite small. According
to Blundell and Hoynes (2003), the diﬀerences in employment outcomes can be at least
partly explained by the interactions with other tax beneﬁts schemes (unemployment
beneﬁts for households with dependent children being much more generous in the UK
than in the USA, for example) as well as by the general economic context (the booming
economy in the USA in the mid nineties). When times are good, employment eﬀects of
in-work beneﬁts may be larger as the larger number of jobs oﬀered may allow individuals
to really trade-oﬀ between working or not, on the basis of the expected gains from work.
When (structural) unemployment is high, in-work beneﬁts may play less of a role in this
respect.
Since we are looking at the second year the policy was introduced, there may also be
policy announcements eﬀects, which make the impact of the policy larger than in later
periods.
3 Evaluating the tax credit measure
3.1 The methodological framework
Most methods for the estimation of treatment eﬀects4 are based on the assumption
of conditional independence. Applying conditional independence to the evaluation of
4 See Wooldridge (2002) for an overview.
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the tax credit implies that the employment probability is the same for an eligible and
an ineligible worker with the same observed individual characteristics. Selection on
unobservables is ruled out.
However, conditional independence is a priori unlikely to be satisﬁed in the evaluation
of the impact of the French tax credit on employment. Wage rates and employment are
potentially correlated,5 whereas the tax credit eligibility is targeted to low-wage workers.
Thus, there is a potential source of selection on unobervables between the treatment and
control group: employment probabilities of the treatment and the control group can be
diﬀerent, even if observables are controlled for.
An additional problem is that for the non-employed eligibility to the tax credit is
not observed since eligibility depends on wage rates. Our method of estimation allows
both for selection on unobservables and for the unobservability of programme eligibility
for the non-employed. We ﬁrst estimate a wage equation, correcting for selectivity on
employment. We assume that the wage equation is the same for the employed and the
unemployed.6 The estimates of the wage distribution can be used to obtain the prob-
ability distribution of programme eligibility. To estimate the impact of the tax credit
measure on employment we specify a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model for the employment
probability. We allow for correlation in unobservables between the employment proba-
bility and the probability of programme eligibility.7
This approach requires making possibly restrictive parametric assumptions. However,
we can partly relax the parametric assumptions made. One of the main criticisms on a
parametric speciﬁcation is that the treatment eﬀect parameter appearing in the single
index of the employment probability does not vary with observables. If we can a priori
distinguish diﬀerent subgroups that are likely to have diﬀerent treatment eﬀects, either
because they obtain diﬀerent treatment or because they may be expected to have diﬀerent
outcomes in response to treatment, we stratify the sample. From the description of the
tax credit measure in the previous section we know that the eligibility depends on marital
5 In the labour supply literature, estimates of wage equations are usually corrected for selectivity on
unobservables for this reason.
6 This is the common approach followed in the labour supply literature. See Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999) for an overview.
7 Note that Wooldridge (2002) suggests this type of solution for comparable problems.
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status since the husband’s income enters the determination of a married woman’s tax
credit but not that of a cohabiting woman. Therefore in our empirical analysis we will
estimate model variants with separate treatment eﬀect by marital status.
Parametric estimation of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model does not require to impose
a common support between the treatment and the control group: the parametric as-
sumption enables the extrapolation out of the sample of the observed characteristics.
However, we also apply a common support for the treatment and control sample. In
particular, common support makes it more likely that the common trends assumption
for the treatment and control group is satisﬁed. Since our approach involves the esti-
mation of the probability of programme eligibility, we can choose a control sample for
which the range of the values of this probability is comparable to the range found in the
treatment sample. We also restrict the treatment sample, taking out observations for
which the probability of programme eligibility is not comparable to corresponding values
in the control sample. We test for the sensitivity of the outcome to the use of common
support.
3.2 The evaluation model: employment outcomes
To evaluate the impact of the tax credit on the employment probability, we use a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model. We deﬁne eligibility on the basis of the legal entitlement
rules, that were spelled out in Section 2. According to these eligibility rules we can write
the relation between (the logarithm of) earnings w∗it and treatment PPEit as
PPEit = ι(lit < w
∗
it < uit) (1)
where lit and uit in (1) are the lower and upperbounds for eligibility depend on the
minimum wage, marital status, household composition, the labour market status of the
spouse, and, for married people, on the earnings of the husband.
We specify the employment status Eit (with Eit = 1 indicating employment, 0 other-
wise). It follows that:
E∗it = x
′
itβ + αPPEit + ψy2002it + γPPEity2002it + ǫit
with Eit = ι(E
∗
it > 0)
(2)
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We use data for the years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 to estimate the model parameters.
Accordingly, (2) contains a time dummy y2002it for the year 2002.
8 The year 2002 is
the policy year in our model.9 In (2) PPEit indicates whether individual i’s earnings
in year t are such that she is eligible for the tax credit. To identify the treatment
eﬀect, we need to assume that (i) the employment probability of the control group is not
aﬀected by the policy change, and (ii) the trend eﬀects are common for the treatment
group and the control group. The latter assumption says that the diﬀerence between the
employment probabilities of the treatment and control groups is time invariant, i.e. that
the employment probabilities of the two groups are not aﬀected diﬀerently by the business
cycle or other institutional changes that may have taken place during the same period.
In this respect, in France at about the same time when the tax credit was introduced,
some other policies changes were made to increase the rewards from work for the low-
skilled. These included the possibility of continuing to receive housing beneﬁts as well
as social security beneﬁts while taking up work for the previously unemployed. Also, the
switch to a “35 hours” working week for some small and medium size entreprises and some
employers’ contributions reductions for hiring low-skilled people were implemented in the
2000s. However, none of these programmes are administered by the tax administration.
They treat married and cohabiting women alike. Eligibility to the “Prime Pour l’Emploi”
tax credit programme is conditional for formally married women on husband’s earnings
and income, while the same condition does not apply to cohabiting women. Moreover, the
earnings and income conditions determining eligibility to the tax credit programme apply
to all workers and not just to the segment of the labour market which were previously
unemployed and receiving welfare (social security assistance) beneﬁts. Also the “35
hours” working week and the employers’ contributions reductions were timed somewhat
8 Time dummies for the years 2000 and 2001 are included in xit.
9 The tax credit was introduced in 2001 and started been paid on the basis of tax declarations made
in 2001, and relating to incomes in 2000. However, the LFS surveys of 1999 to 2002 were all carried out
in March and surveyed incomes in the year of the survey. At the time that the 2001 LFS survey was
been carried out, the tax credit had just been created. This is why 2001 is a control year, while 2002
is the treatment year. At the time of carrying out the 2002 LFS surveys, in March 2002, tax credits
had already been paid out, in September 2001, on the basis of the 2001 tax declarations. The 2002 LFS
survey surveys individuals incomes in 2002. So it is seems right to consider 2002 as a policy year and
2001 as a control year.
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diﬀerently than the tax credit measure. Therefore, our approach should enable us to
disentangle the impact of the introduction of the tax credit from that of other policy
changes.
Under the assumptions (i) and (ii), the parameter ψ in (2) indicates a ‘pure’ time
eﬀect, that is common to the treatment and control group and refers to factors speciﬁc
to the year 2002 that are other than the tax credit measure, and the parameter γ in (2)
refers to the treatment eﬀect, that is speciﬁc to individuals belonging to the treatment
group of the eligible with PPE = 1.
However, earnings w∗it are not observed for the non-employed, and therefore, by (1) eli-
gibility is not directly observed. Further to this, unobservable factors that aﬀect earnings
may be correlated with unobservable factors aﬀecting the employment probability. As
eligibility (PPE) depends on earnings by (1), selection on unobservables may aﬀect the
comparison of the outcome variable for the treated with the outcome of the non-treated,
even after conditioning on observables.
To address these issues, let us ﬁrst write down the equation for log-earnings:
w∗it = z
′
itη + νit with E(νit|zit) = 0, V ar(νit) = σ2ν (3)
In (3) w∗it represents the (possibly latent) log-earnings.
Under normality of νit in the wage equation (3), the probability of programme eligi-
bility reads
p(z˜it) = P (PPEit = 1|z˜it) = P (lit < w∗it < uit) = Φ
(
uit − η′zit
σν
)
− Φ
(
lit − η′zit
σν
)
(4)
with z˜it including the variables in zit, lit, and uit.
We employ a two-step method to estimate this model. In the ﬁrst step, the parameters
of the wage distribution are estimated. We use an auxiliary participation equation to
correct for selectivity bias.10 At this stage we assume that νit is normally distributed, and
that participation follows a probit speciﬁcation, which is estimated jointly by maximum
likelihood with the parameters of the earnings equation in (3), allowing for correlation
10 This auxiliary employment equation does not contain the treatment indicator PPEit, so splitting
up the sample in treated and controls does not play a role at this stage.
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in the errors. Thus, we obtain parameter estimates of η and σν , the standard deviation
of νit, say ηˆ and σˆν .
As an alternative ‘shortcut’ that may be taken to our approach, individuals may be
assigned to the treatment or control group on the basis of ‘predicted’ wages wˆit = z
′
itηˆ.
Eligibility then is predicted by ̂PPEit = ι(lit < wˆit < uit). But given that ̂PPEit =
ι(lit+ νit < w
∗
it < uit+νit) an errors-in-variables bias is introduced since
̂PPEit depends
on νit.
11 Our method also allows for the presence of measurement error in earnings and
misclassiﬁcation in programme eligibility
To allow for possible correlation of unobservables aﬀecting eligibility PPEit with the
error term ǫit of the employment equation (2), we ﬁrst specify the joint distribution of ǫit
and νit (the errors, respectively, of the employment equation and the earnings equation)
and next, derive the joint distribution of PPEit and Eit, by using the relation between
eligibility and earnings, spelled out in equations (1) and (4). To this end, we assume
that ǫit and νit follow a bivariate normal distribution:(
ǫit
νit
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
1 ρσν
ρσν σ
2
ν
))
(5)
Now the joint probability of Eit = 1 and PPEit = 1 reads:
P (Eit = 1, PPEit = 1|xit, y2002it, z˜it) =∫
A
Φ
(
x′itβ + α+ ψy2002it + γy2002it + ρν√
1− ρ2
)
1√
2π
exp
{
−1
2
ν2
}
dν (6)
with
A = {ν|Lit < ν < Uit} , Lit = lit − ηˆ
′zit
σˆν
, Uit =
uit − ηˆ′zit
σˆν
(7)
The region A determines the range of wages for which programme eligibility applies.
Therefore, (6) may be interpreted as the employment probability, restricted to and
weighted by the region of unobservables for which eligibility applies.
Similarly, we can write the joint probability of Eit = 1, PPEit = 0 as
11 An additional problem that arises is that P̂PEit is discontinuous in ηˆ. Therefore, it is nonstandard
to correct the standard error of the eventual treatment effect obtained by this method for the standard
errors of the first stage parameters.
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P (Eit = 1, PPEit = 0|xit, y2002it, z˜it) =∫
B
Φ
(
x′itβ + ψy2002it + ρν√
1− ρ2
)
1√
2π
exp
{
−1
2
ν2
}
dν (8)
with
B = {ν|ν ≤ Lit, ν ≥ Uit} (9)
and Uit and Lit as deﬁned in (7).
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For someone nonemployed, we do not observe PPEit, but we can deﬁne the probability
of nonemployment, which typically will be a mixture of the events PPEit = 1 and
PPEit = 0.
13
If we denote φ(ν) as the standard normal density function, we may write
P (Eit = 0|xit, y2002it, z˜it) =
∫
A
[
1− Φ
(
x′itβ + α+ ψy2002it + γy2002it + ρν√
1− ρ2
)]
φ(ν)dv+
+
∫
B
[
1− Φ
(
x′itβ + ψy2002it + ρν√
1− ρ2
)]
φ(ν)dv (10)
with A and B as deﬁned in (7) and (9), respectively. Here (10) is a weighted average
of the probability of nonemployment for eligible and ineligible individuals. For someone
with a large probability of being eligible, the integration region A is large and conse-
quently a high weight is assigned to the probability for the eligible. So rather than an
exact assigment of someone nonemployed to the treatment or control group we have this
probabilistic assignment which accounts for the fact that PPEit is not observed for the
nonemployed.
The probabilities in (6), (8), and (10) are the likelihood contributions for the eligible
employed, the ineligible employed, and the nonemployed, respectively, and they can be
used to construct the likelihood function and estimate the model parameters, including
the treatment parameter γ, by maximum likelihood.
We correct the standard errors of the estimates for the variance of the ﬁrst stage
estimates of the wage equation. Moreover, the standard errors are obtained by robust
12 If there is no selection on unobservables, ρ = 0 and the expressions (6) and (8) become the product
of the employment probability and the probability of programme eligibility.
13 The underlying assumption is that the earnings equation in (3) is the same for the employed and
the non-employed.
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estimators, to account for the possibility of serial dependence. Some authors have high-
lighted the importance of accounting for possible serial correlation in the context of
diﬀerence-in diﬀerence models (see, for example, Beblo et al., 2001). Serial correlation
may seriously bias the standard errors of the model, though it appears to be more of a
problem in the case of long-time series data (see also Kezdi, 2002). In our model, serial
correlation may arise due to correlation of the explanatory variables through time. This
may especially be the case for the binary treatment variable determining eligibility to the
programme. Serial correlation may also come about from highly positively correlated val-
ues of the dependent variable over time. To control for possible serial correlation, robust
standard errors are estimated using the Huber/White/sandwich estimator. In particular,
the standard errors are also robust against possibly unobserved time-invariant random
eﬀects.
To evaluate the treatment eﬀect for the treated on the employment probability, we
compute the employment probability for someone who is eligible and is treated and the
employment probability for someone who is eligible but not treated (i.e. does not get
the tax credit). More speciﬁcally, we compute
P (Ejit = 1|PPEit = 1, xit, y2002it, z˜it) =
P (Ejit = 1, PPEit = 1|xit, y2002it, z˜it)
P (PPEit = 1|xit, y2002it, z˜it) (11)
for j = 0, 1. For j = 1 (11) is computed directly using (6) with γy2002it replaced by
γ (treatment), whereas for j = 0 in (6) γy2002it is replaced by zero (non-treatment).
Taking diﬀerences and averaging over all time periods and individuals we obtain the
treatment eﬀect in terms of the employment probability.
3.3 Programme evaluation: working hours outcomes
Employed women may decide to work more or fewer hours, depending on the relative
sizes of income and substitution eﬀects induced by the tax credit. We analyse working
hours responses as a straightforward extension of the analysis of employment eﬀects.
Here, we adopt a “naive” approach to modelling working hours, by specifying a simple
linear equation in hours. Zero working hours are included as a corner solution, to allow
for selectivity. We use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences equation for working hours that is a
12
direct extension of (2). If hit denotes the observed level of working hours, we have the
following equation
h∗it = x
′
itβ + αPPEit + ψy2002it + γPPEity2002it + ǫit
with hit = ι(h
∗
it > 0)h
∗
it
(12)
We allow for endogeneity of eligibility by assuming that the errors ǫit of the hours equa-
tion and νit of the wage equation follow a bivariate normal distribution:(
ǫit
νit
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ2ǫ ρσǫσν
ρσǫσν σ
2
ν
))
(13)
Using the assumption (13) we can construct the joint distribution of working hours hit
and programme eligibility PPEit. For the nonworking individuals, we have hit = 0 and
the likelihood contribution is almost the same as before in (10)
P (hit = 0|xit, y2002it, z˜it) =
∫
A
[
1− Φ
(
x′itβ + α+ ψy2002it + γy2002it + ρσǫν
σǫ
√
1− ρ2
)]
φ(ν)dv+
+
∫
B
[
1− Φ
(
x′itβ + ψy2002it + ρσǫν
σǫ
√
1− ρ2
)]
φ(ν)dv (14)
To write down the likelihood contributions for positive working hours, we ﬁrst intro-
duce the notation h¯it(PPEit) with
h¯it(PPEit) = x
′
itβ + αPPEit + ψy2002it + γPPEity2002it (15)
Then the likelihood function for positive working hours hit and PPEit = 1 is
f(hit, PPEit = 1|xit, y2002it, z˜it) =
1
σǫ
φ
(
hit − h¯it(1)
σǫ
)Φ
Uit − ρ
(
hit−h¯it(1)
σǫ
)
√
1− ρ2
− Φ
Lit − ρ
(
hit−h¯it(1)
σǫ
)
√
1− ρ2
 (16)
with φ(.) the standard normal density function, and Uit and Lit as deﬁned in (7).
The likelihood contribution for observations with positive working hours and PPEit =
reads
f(hit, PPEit = 0|xit, y2002it, z˜it) =
1
σǫ
φ
(
hit − h¯it(0)
σǫ
)1− Φ
Uit − ρ
(
hit−h¯it(0)
σǫ
)
√
1− ρ2
+Φ
Lit − ρ
(
hit−h¯it(0)
σǫ
)
√
1− ρ2
 (17)
We compute the treatment eﬀect for the treated as the sample average of the diﬀerence
in expected hours, conditional on PPEit = 1, for the cases γ 	= 0 (treatment) and γ = 0
(nontreatment).
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4 The data and the selection of the sample for analy-
sis
The sample for analysis is drawn from the French Labour Force Surveys of years 1999
to 2002. We cannot extend the analysis to later years as from 2003 onwards there was a
break in the LFS series due to harmonization with other European datasets. The new
data are not comparable to the earlier series. In particular, the concepts of employment
and unemployment cannot be compared.
The LFS survey has a rotating panel structure which enables one to construct an
(unbalanced) longitudinal panel sample. Around 60,000 households are interviewed each
year in March. For our analysis, we select from each survey year a sample of women
that are:
- either household heads or spouse of the head;
- aged over 16 years and less than 52 years at the time of each survey;
- employed in salaried work or unemployed or housewives.
Until age 16, school is compulsory in France. Special labour market programmes
apply to individuals aged 55 and over, who are, for example, exempted from searching
for a job while receiving unemployment beneﬁts, and protected from dismissal, if in-work
(by the so called “Delalande” law which obliges employers to pay extra-compensation
money for the dismissal of older workers). Self-employed women were dropped from the
sample as their earnings were not surveyed by the LFS of 1999-2002.14
In addition to this, only women reporting to be either employed or unemployed, on a
broad range of criteria, or housewives were kept in the sample. Full-time students and
trainees as well as retired women were discarded from the sample.
14 As from year 2003 the design of the French labour force surveys was changed dramatically. Starting
from 2003, the survey is run four times a year; a new questionnaire has been written; and half of the
interviews (the second and the third) are done by telephone, rather than by person at the house of the
respondent. According to the French national statistical offices, the new LFS surveys are not comparable
to the earlier annual surveys. In particular, information on respondents’ employment status cannot be
compared, which makes it infeasible for us to extend the analysis to 2003 and later policy years (see
also INSEE, 2003).
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Along the same lines, women with a self-employed husband, or a retired husband or
an employed husband that did not report earnings from work were also dropped from
the sample, to enable us to apply the total household income conditions for eligibility to
the tax credit.
Other studies of French labour supply eliminate from the sample for analysis also
women that are public sector employees, as most of them have a special social security
status - for example, they have special pension and retirement arrangements- which goes
together with a long-term employment contract, so that they enjoy a lower probability
of leaving or loosing their job than other comparable individuals in the private sector.
Here, we keep these women in the sample for a number of reasons. First of all, we
cannot exclude that some transitions from non-participation, unemployment or other
employment statuses to the status of public employee will take place. For this reason,
we also want to include public workers in our sample and account for their wages in the
wage regression to predict earnings for non-employed people. Secondly, reducing working
hours (one of the possible induced eﬀects of the tax credit programme) may actually be
easier for public workers than for private sectors employees, which could compensate
for the possibly lower quittal rates of this category of workers. Thirdly, women tend
to be over-represented among public sector employees and them being the focus of our
analysis, throwing public employees away we may end up with a non-representative
selected sample of women.
Some women in the sample report hourly earnings below the minimum wage. Cross-
checking observations with unusually low earnings against an indicator of unreliable
survey responses provided in the survey, we could not ﬁnd any correlation between the
two. Other cross-checkings, for example with the self-employed status or the education
and training statuses, did not give any additional information either. Basically, we could
not ﬁnd any evidence that women reporting less than the hourly minimum wage were
misreporting their wages. Moreover, in France, in jobs like babysitting, workers may
happen to earn less than the hourly minimum wage. The standard contract for these
household employees distinguishes between “active” and “passive” hours of work, where
“active” hours of work amount to 2/3 of the actual working time and they are the ones
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actually paid for by the employers. For these reasons, we have resolved to draw the line
at half the hourly minimum wage and drop those observations earning less than this
from our sample.
Finally, we drop women that have more than one job, which represent about 2.5% of
the (ﬁnal) sample (about 600 observations), in each of the years considered. On the one
hand, only earnings and hours of work in the “main job” are surveyed and, on the other
hand, it would be diﬃcult to predict (total) earnings for these women.
Having selected according to the criteria above the sample for analysis, we end up
with roughly 24,000 through 25,000 women for each year considered. Women are next
matched to their partners, if any, and all observations are pooled over the four-year
period considered, from year 1999 to year 2002.
As far as variables construction goes, the following comments are in order. The wage
information available in the survey relates to current monthly wages at the time of the
survey, net of (after) employee payroll taxes but gross of (before) employee income taxes.
Information on wage bonuses is collected in a separate question. We add wage bonuses
to women’s monthly wages to compute the total monthly wage. Information on usual
weekly working hours is used to compute the hourly wage.
Total income is constructed as the sum of the income of the two partners. To de-
termine eligibility to the tax credit, total income is computed setting it to women’s
earnings and adding the income of the husband to determine eligibility to the tax credit.
Husbands’ income includes earnings from work or unemployment beneﬁts when avail-
able. Other sources of income are not taken into consideration here, as they were not
collected by the survey. No information is available on non-wage income except for
unemployment beneﬁts. We assume that income from property or interests on savings
are on average negligible. This does not seem as too strong an assumption given that
we restrict attention to low-paid workers. Taxable income is computed by applying a
standard approximation.
Education level dummies are increasing in educational level, the basis being the high-
est education level, equivalent to a university degree. Experience is computed by sub-
tracting age at the end of formal schooling from current age.
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To account for local labour market conditions, we have constructed a series of dum-
mies for the region of residence, with base “Ile-de-France”, the region of Paris. The
area of residence dummies account additionally for the size of the agglomeration where
individuals reside:
- small cities include rural neighbourhoods or urban neighbourhoods with less than
20,000 inhabitants;
- large cities are those with more than 200,000 inhabitants;
- Paris stands on its own as the largest urban agglomeration in France;
The base for these dummies are medium size cities with a population of 20,000 to
200,000 inhabitants. Given that “Paris” accounts for a large share of the population of
“Ile-de-France”, we only enter “Ile-de-France” in our regressions.
Descriptive statistics of this sample for the four years considered are given in Table
3.
5 Results of estimation of the model
5.1 The probability of eligibility
In a ﬁrst step we have estimated the parameters of the wage equation (3).15 We
use the estimated parameter values of the wage equation to compute the probability of
eligibility (4) for the tax credit. The probability of eligibility provides a basis for compar-
ing the treatment and the control group. Recall that we can only observe for employed
individuals whether or not someone is eligible. For the nonemployed, however, we can
observe the probability of eligibility. Figure 2 shows the sample distribution of the values
that the probability of participation takes for the entire sample (89509 observations). It
shows a peak at a value of the probability of eligibility of 0.80, indicating that a major
part of the sample respondents has a reasonably large probability of eligibility, but we
also see a small concentration of observations at probability values near zero. In the
15 The estimation procedure is described in Appendix A. The estimates of the wage equation are
given in table A.1.
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ﬁgures 3 through 5 we have splitted the sample by labour market status and eligibility.
Figure 3 shows the empirical distribution of the probability of eligibility for the eligible
employed (41170 observations) and ﬁgure 4 shows the probability of eligibility for the
ineligible employed (20663 observations). The distribution is quite diﬀerent for these two
groups. The distribution for the ineligible (ﬁgure 4) shows much higher sample frequen-
cies at smaller probabilities of eligibility, whereas there are relatively few observations
with a probability of eligibility that is larger than 0.80. The distribution of the eligible
(ﬁgure 3) shows that there are not much eligible women with a probability of eligibility
near zero, but a large part has a probability of eligibility of around 0.80. Thus, we see
that the part of the subsample of the ineligible women with the low probability of eligible
is not very useful as a comparison group for the eligible. For the part of the subsam-
ple of the eligible women with the highest probability of eligibility there are hardly any
comparable observations in the subsample of the ineligible women. Figure 5 shows the
empirical distribution of the probability of elibility for the nonemployed (27676 obser-
vations). We can see that the distribution looks more similar to the distribution of the
eligible employed women than to the ineligible employed women, although we also spot
a small peak near zero. Therefore the policy measure seems to reach the target group,
in terms of programme eligibility.
Although the model we use is parametric so that we are able to estimate the employ-
ment probability also for observations in the treatment group that have no comparable
counterparts in the control group, it seems wise to restrict the sample to improve the
match between treatment and control group. First, it does not make much sense to
include observations in the control group with a very small probability of eligibility. To
make a selection, let us look at the 1% percentile of the empirical distribution of the
probability. For the subsample of the eligible women this 1% quantile is 0.14, whereas for
the subsample of the ineligible women the 1% percentile is 0.068, and for the subsample
of nonemployed it is 0.10. Next, let us consider the 99% percentile: for the subsample
of eligible employed women the probability is 0.97, and for the subsample of ineligible
employed women and nonemployed women the values are 0.88 and 0.98, respectively.
We estimate the treatment eﬀect excluding observations with a low probability of
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eligibility, and next to this also dropping observations with a very high probability of
eligibility. The cutoﬀ points for the sample are chosen to be the 1% percentile of the
subsample of the eligible employed and the 99% percentile of the subsample of the
ineligible employed. Table 4 shows the values of this selection criterion and its impact
on the number of observations in the sample. We also estimate the treatment eﬀect
separately for married, cohabiting, and single women. For each subsample the sample
selection criteria can be found in table 4.
5.2 Employment effects
We have computed the treatment eﬀect for diﬀerent samples, selected on the basis
of the correspondence of the probability of eligibility for the treatment and the control
group (see table 4).
To gain preliminary insights into the employment eﬀects of the tax credit, we show
pseudo-raw probabilities in Table 5. These were obtained by estimating the employment
equation without covariates, except the intercept, PPE (parameter α), the time dummy
for year 2002 (parameter ψ), and the treatment parameter γ, and using (11). If we
use the full sample, the employment eﬀect of the tax credit is found to be negative and
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. However, if we select the sample so that the range of the
probability of eligibility coincides for the treatment and control group, we ﬁnd that the
‘raw’ treatment eﬀect is negative but not signiﬁcant.
On the other hand, the treatment eﬀect for married women is positive, but not sig-
niﬁcant and small in size, for any sample. For cohabiting women, the eﬀect is also
insigniﬁcant, though the sign of the eﬀect varies for diﬀerent samples. For single women,
the treatment eﬀect is negative and not signiﬁcant.
Next, we have estimated the model including controls. We have estimated the model
ﬁrst, without correcting for possible endogeneity of programme eligibility (ρ = 0) and
next, accounting for the possible endogeneity of eligibility. The treatment eﬀect for the
full sample is negative and insigniﬁcant. The eﬀects for married, cohabiting, and single
women, respectively, are also negative and insigniﬁcant.16
16 Results of the estimation of all the parameters of the model for the main case (corresponding to
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The results of estimation do not vary substantially when we correct for the endogeneity
of programme eligibility, which is plausible if the treatment eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
However, for all variants we have estimated, we found that the parameter ρ is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, according to the likelihood ratio test.
From these results, we conclude that there is no evidence of any positive eﬀect of the
tax credit on employment.
5.3 Effects on working hours
To evaluate the impact of the tax credit on weekly working hours, we have estimated
the model outlined in (12) for the several subsamples listed in table 4. We have computed
the treatment eﬀect on working hours as the diﬀerence in expected working hours in
the case of treatment (γ 	= 0) and non-treatment (γ = 0), conditional on eligibility
(PPEit = 1). To compute expected working hours, we made use of the probability
density function of working hours given in (14) through (16).
For each subsample we have estimated two variants of the model: (i) the model
without covariates and ρ = 0 as an indication of the ‘raw’ treatment eﬀect; (ii) the
model with covariates and with ρ unrestricted. For reasons of conciseness, we did not
estimate a model variant with covariates and with ρ restricted to zero. The resulting
treatment eﬀects are given in table 6.
The model without controls (see the 3rd column of Table 6) shows that for the entire
sample (without selection on marital status) the ‘raw’ treatment eﬀect on working hours
is positive, but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and its size is smaller than 1. For
the subsample of married women we ﬁnd a somewhat larger eﬀect on working hours of
around 1. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant for the sample in which the range of the probability
of eligibility is the intersection of the range for the eligible and the ineligible. Thus, the
‘raw’ treatment eﬀect for married women suggests that there may be a positive impact of
the tax credit on working hours. For cohabiting women, the sign of the treatment eﬀect
varies with the selection of the sample, but it remains not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
the variant on the first line of Table 5) are given in table B.1. We have excluded the dummy variable for
Ile de France from the employment equation. The specific form of the eligibility rules provide a source
of identification, irrespective of exclusion restrictions.
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zero. For single women, the ‘raw’ treatment eﬀects are negative but not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.
The ﬁnal column of Table 6 shows the treatment eﬀects based on the model variant
that corrects for selection on both observables and unobservables. For the entire sample,
the treatment eﬀect is now negative, small in size, and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, suggesting no eﬀect of the tax credit on average working hours. For the subsample
of married women, the treatment eﬀect is still positive, but smaller in magnitude, and
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. For cohabiting women, the treatment eﬀect has
now become negative, and this for any sample selection, but is remains not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Finally, for single women, the treatment eﬀect after correction for
selection on observables and unobservables, remains negative. The size of the negative
coeﬃcient is somewhat larger than for the ‘raw’ case, but it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
We conclude, therefore, that the tax credit did not aﬀect women’s working hours.
6 Conclusions
This paper evaluates the impact of the French tax credit on the employment and
working hours of women. Like similar in-work beneﬁts programmes, this programme is
expected to increase the incentives to work for non-employed persons. However, it may
decrease incentives to work for (married) individuals with a working partner entitled to
the tax credit, because of the means-testing on total household resources.
Since the introduction of the measure a number of ex-ante policy evaluation studies
were carried out, all based on microsimulations or on structural labour supply models,
estimated on data collected before the policy was created. The main conclusions from
these studies were that the tax credit had little redistributive impact and very small
employment eﬀects, if any at all. Stancanelli (2004) was the ﬁrst to estimate a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences evaluation model of the employment eﬀects of the policy. She ﬁnds some
evidence of negative employment eﬀects of the policy for married women. The overall
employment impact is found to be insigniﬁcant.
21
We extend here the study of Stancanelli (2004), by explicitly allowing for endogene-
ity of programme participation and by analyzing hours responses as well. We model
employment simultaneously with programme eligibility. Programme eligibility is not
directly observed for the unemployed, as wages are not observed for the unemployed.
Programme eligibility is targeted at low-wage workers. We therefore allow for selection
on unobservables as it is likely that unobserved variation in wages will be correlated with
employment.
We analyse the impact of the tax credit measure on two outcome variables: employ-
ment and working hours. We analyse the treatment eﬀect for subsamples of married
women, cohabiting women, and single women. The treatment eﬀect for each of these
three groups is potentially diﬀerent. We also analyse the sensitivity of the results with
respect to diﬀerent selections of the sample, on basis of the probability of eligibility.
For neither of the subsamples, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the tax credit on the
employment probability. The same holds for the analysis of hours decisions: the impact
of the tax credit on average working hours is relatively small in size and it is statistically
not signiﬁcant.
We conclude therefore that, allowing for endogeneity of programme eligibility, for
diﬀerent cuts of the treatment and the control group, and for diﬀerent sub-populations
deﬁned according to marital status, there is no signiﬁcant impact of programme eligibility
on employment nor on working hours.
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Table 1: Earnings and total income thresholds for eligibility to the tax credit
Earnings thresholds Income bound
(euros per year) (euros per year)
Marital Status lower bound upper bound
Single women 3187 14872 11772
Married women 3187 14872 23544
These threshold relates to the rules in force in 2001, which are relevant for the purposes
of our analysis. They are defined in terms of taxable earnings and income. Notice that
income is taxed at a much higher rate than earnings from work in France. The upper
earnings threshold is equal to 22654 euros for married women with a non-employed
husband or a husband earning less than the lower earnings threshold. The income
bound is increased by 3253 euros per each dependent child.
Table 2. Amounts of tax credit payable, 2001 rules.
Earnings from work Tax credit
euros per year euros per year
Lower bound Upper bound
0 3187 0%
3187 10623* 4.4% * earnings
10623* 14872* (14872-earnings)*5.5% (#)
(*)These are defined in terms of full-time equivalent earnings.
# This percentage was changed to 11% as from 2002 and applied
to the 2002 earnings but it is not obvious that respondents to
the March 2002 LFS would be already aware of this and, moreover,
they would not have had time to adapt their behaviour to this change.
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Table 3: Sample descriptives
Variable Full sample, N = 89509 nonemployed, N = 27676
mean standard dev mean standard dev
Age 36.7 8.2 35.8 8.1
Education level 1 (lowest) 0.24 0.43 0.40 0.49
Education level 2 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29
Education level 3 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44
Edcuation level 4 0.16 0.37 0.12 0.33
Edcuation level 5 0.14 0.35 0.07 0.25
Married 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.50
Cohabiting 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43
Single 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40
# of children 1.34 1.18 1.81 1.33
Children,age < 3 0.15 0.36 0.25 0.43
Ile de France 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34
Champagne Ardenne 0.032 0.18 0.037 0.19
Haute Normandie 0.038 0.19 0.042 0.20
Basse Normandie 0.026 0.16 0.024 0.15
Picardie 0.039 0.19 0.045 0.21
Centre 0.040 0.19 0.034 0.18
Bourgogne 0.031 0.17 0.032 0.18
Calais 0.071 0.26 0.110 0.31
Lorraine 0.037 0.19 0.040 0.20
Alsace 0.038 0.19 0.033 0.18
Franche Comte 0.038 0.19 0.035 0.18
Loire 0.053 0.22 0.049 0.22
Bretagne 0.047 0.21 0.037 0.19
Poitou Charente 0.035 0.18 0.032 0.18
Aquitanie 0.043 0.20 0.044 0.20
MidiPyrenes 0.032 0.18 0.031 0.17
Limousin 0.027 0.16 0.022 0.15
Rhones Alpes 0.072 0.26 0.066 0.25
Auvergne 0.028 0.17 0.029 0.17
Languedoc Roussillon 0.035 0.18 0.048 0.21
Provence 0.066 0.25 0.079 0.27
Paris 0.148 0.35 0.114 0.32
French nationality 0.92 0.27 0.86 0.34
y2001 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43
y2002 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42
y1999 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.45
P (PPE = 1) 0.65 0.26 0.75 0.23
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Table 3 (continued): Sample descriptives
Variable Eligible employed, N = 41170 Ineligible employed, N = 20663
mean standard dev mean standard dev
Age 35.9 8.2 39.4 7.5
Education level 1 (lowest) 0.23 0.42 0.05 0.21
Education level 2 0.09 0.29 0.05 0.23
Education level 3 0.32 0.47 0.16 0.37
Education level 4 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.38
Education level 5 0.12 0.32 0.30 0.46
Married 0.47 0.50 0.55 0.50
Cohabiting 0.27 0.44 0.19 0.39
Single 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44
# of children 1.11 1.04 1.17 1.03
Children,age < 3 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.31
Ile de France 0.14 0.35 0.28 0.45
Champagne Ardenne 0.032 0.18 0.024 0.15
Haute Normandie 0.038 0.19 0.033 0.18
Basse Normandie 0.029 0.17 0.025 0.16
Picardie 0.038 0.19 0.034 0.18
Centre 0.046 0.21 0.033 0.18
Bourgogne 0.033 0.18 0.027 0.16
Calais 0.056 0.23 0.050 0.22
Lorraine 0.036 0.19 0.035 0.18
Alsace 0.040 0.20 0.040 0.20
Franche Comte 0.041 0.20 0.035 0.18
Loire 0.062 0.24 0.041 0.20
Bretagne 0.055 0.23 0.047 0.21
Poitou Charente 0.041 0.20 0.027 0.16
Aquitanie 0.045 0.21 0.039 0.19
MidiPyrenes 0.035 0.18 0.027 0.16
Limousin 0.033 0.18 0.024 0.15
Rhones Alpes 0.075 0.26 0.075 0.26
Auvergne 0.030 0.17 0.024 0.15
Languedoc Roussillon 0.031 0.17 0.025 0.16
Provence 0.063 0.24 0.052 0.22
Paris 0.119 0.32 0.251 0.43
Weekly working hours 35.0 10.3 35.0 8.7
Hourly wage rate 39.35 7.49 75.03 43.82
French nationality 0.93 0.25 0.96 0.19
y2001 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43
y2002 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45
y1999 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42
P (PPE = 1) 0.72 0.19 0.39 0.24
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Table 4: Selection of the sample
on basis of the probability of eligibility
Sample restricted Range of probability of
from below eligibility “matched”
Family Range Number Range Number
status probability of probability of
of eligibility observations of eligibility observations
All > 0.16 84134 (0.16, 0.89) 69160
Married > 0.17 41783 (0.17, 0.87) 33897
Cohabitants > 0.20 20751 (0.20, 0.93) 17335
Single > 0.14 21282 (0.14, 0.88) 17692
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Table 5: Treatment eﬀects: impact of program eligibility
on the employment probability
Selection Selection on No Controls, Controls, endogeneity
family probability controls ρ = 0 eligibility
status of eligibility accounted for (ρ 	= 0)
All none -0.026* -0.011 -0.010
(0.015) (0.0089) (0.0087)
All > 0.16 -0.0048 -0.0097 -0.0074
(0.031) (0.0091) (0.012)
All (0.16, 0.89) -0.016 -0.0077 -0.0084
(0.031) (0.0097) (0.021)
Married > 0.17 0.0040 -0.013 -0.010
(0.029) (0.013) (0.017)
Married (0.17, 0.87) 0.00034 -0.0043 -0.0047
(0.18) (0.014) (0.50)
Cohabitants > 0.20 0.00032 -0.0054 -0.0027
(0.038) (0.016) (0.019)
Cohabitants (0.20, 0.93) -0.035 -0.017 -0.016
(0.034) (0.016) (0.019)
Single > 0.14 -0.030 -0.020 -0.018
(0.041) (0.014) (0.015)
Single (0.14, 0.88) -0.047 -0.016 -0.021
(0.034) (0.014) (0.066)
Treatment effects are expressed in termsof the employment probability,
conform (11). Standard errors in parentheses.
**: significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
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Table 6: Treatment eﬀects: impact of program eligibility
on weekly working hours
Selection Selection on No Controls, endogeneity
family probability controls eligibility
status of eligibility accounted for (ρ 	= 0)
All none 0.24 -0.41
(0.54) (0.40)
All > 0.16 0.82* -0.18
(0.48) (0.58)
All (0.16, 0.89) 0.38 -0.13
(0.67) (0.46)
Married > 0.17 1.15 0.024
(0.78) (1.79)
Married (0.17, 0.87) 1.08** 0.49
(0.49) (0.72)
Cohabitants > 0.20 1.00 -0.40
(1.02) (1.38)
Cohabitants (0.20, 0.93) -0.48 -1.11
(1.08) (1.04)
Single > 0.14 -0.23 -0.89
(2.49) (0.87)
Single (0.14, 0.88) -0.96 -0.89
(0.95) (0.87)
Treatment effects are expressed in termsof the employment probability,
conform (11). Standard errors in parentheses.
**: significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
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A Estimation of the wage equation
We estimate the parameters of the wage equation (3) jointly with an equation for par-
ticipation. If we let dit be a dummy indicator for particpation (dit = 1 if participating,
0 if not), mit a vector of observables, ζ a parameter vector, and eit an unobserved error,
the participation is modelled by
d∗it = m
′
itζ + eit, and dit = ι(d
∗
it > 0) (18)
The parameters η and σν if the wage equation (3) and the parameter of ζ of the participa-
tion equation are jointly estimated by maximum likelihood. The outcomes for the wage
equation serve as input for the second, main stage of the estimation of the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence model. The parameters of the wage equation can be found in table A.1. The
two higher education levels have been combined in the estimation of the wage equation,
as the number of observations with the highest education level that are eligible for the
tax credit is very low.
Table A.1: Parameter estimates of the wage equation
Variable Parameter Standard error
Ln Age -41.6** 3.4
(Ln Age) Squared 11.9** 0.95
(Ln Age) Cube -1.1** 0.09
Ln Experience 0.20** 0.009
(Ln Experience) squared -0.072** 0.003
Education level 1 -0.46** 0.006
Education level 2 -0.35** 0.006
Education level 3 -0.33** 0.004
Education level 4 -0.22** 0.004
Ile de France 0.14** 0.003
Year 2001 0.14** 0.003
Year 2002 0.026** 0.003
Year 1999 -0.019** 0.003
Incercept 51.2** 3.9
σν 0.30** 0.0009
**: significant at 5% level;
*: significant at 10% level
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B Complete set of estimates for entire sample
Table B.1: Parameter estimates of the Difference-in-difference model
Entire sample, no selection on probability of eligibility
Variable Parameter Standard error
Intercept -20.471** 2.145
Education level 1 -1.249** 0.300
Education level 2 -0.785** 0.235
Education level 3 -0.684** 0.228
Education level 4 -0.381** 0.154
Education level 5 0.032 0.024
Ln age 11.118** 0.967
Square of Ln age -1.417** 0.112
Any Children younger than 3 -0.447** 0.017
Number of children -0.282** 0.012
French Nationality 0.472** 0.026
Married 0.043** 0.022
Cohabitating -0.014 0.015
chaard0 -0.368** 0.084
Haute Normandie -0.283** 0.078
Basse Normandie -0.187** 0.082
Picardie -0.287** 0.080
Centre -0.120 0.074
Bourgogne -0.312** 0.079
Calais -0.596** 0.086
Lorraine -0.346** 0.080
Alsace -0.106 0.072
Franche Comte -0.192** 0.078
Loire -0.216** 0.076
Bretagne -0.153** 0.075
Poutou Charente -0.267** 0.078
Aquitanie -0.356** 0.078
Midi Pyrenes -0.369** 0.079
Limousin -0.179** 0.077
Rhones Alpes -0.212** 0.071
Auvergne -0.395** 0.083
Languedoc Roussillon -0.640** 0.087
Provence -0.489** 0.081
Year 2000 0.057** 0.017
Year 2001 0.098** 0.015
Year 2002 0.160** 0.042
α 0.456 0.480
γ (treatment) -0.043 0.037
ρ -0.238 0.291
**: significant at 5% level;
*: significant at 10% level
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Figure 1: Amount of tax credit by earnings
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Figure 2: probability of eligibility, entire sample
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Figure 3: probability of eligibility, subsample of the employed eligible
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Figure 4: probability of eligibility, subsample of employed ineligible
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Figure 5: probability of eligibility, subsample of nonemployed
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